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HOWARD F. CHANG* 
ABSTRACT 
The dispute between the United States and the European Union 
(“EU”) regarding the EU ban on meat imports treated with hormones 
raises the question: How should regulators respond to public fears that are 
disproportionate to the risks as evaluated by experts in risk assessment?  If 
regulators cannot eliminate public fears through education, then there is 
some social benefit from regulations that reduce the feared risks and 
thereby reduce public anxiety and distortions in behavior flowing from that 
anxiety.  These considerations imply that we cannot simply ignore public 
fears that technocrats would deem “irrational.”  On the other hand, there 
is the danger that special interests may seek to generate consumer anxiety 
and lobby for regulations that serve their interests.  I explore an approach 
that takes public fears seriously as social costs but also treats them as 
endogenous variables.  I use this framework to evaluate risk regulations in 
terms of economic efficiency and suggest that the danger of inefficient 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Copyright © 2004 by Howard F. 
Chang.  I would like to thank Matthew Adler, Andrew Guzman, Robert Howse, Louis Kaplow, Eric 
Posner, Kal Raustiala, Curtis Reitz, Michael Rothschild, Cass Sunstein, and workshop participants at 
Princeton University, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Michigan, Temple 
University, and the 2003 meeting of the American Law and Economics Association for helpful 
comments. 
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regulation is most acute when domestic industries promote or sustain fears 
regarding imported products.  From this perspective, the World Trade 
Organization ruling against the EU in the hormones dispute, based on the 
risk assessment requirements in the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, may represent a reasonable 
approach to guarding against the danger of regulatory protectionism, 
understood broadly to describe inefficient regulations that the importing 
country would not have adopted but for the foreign nationality of the 
producers disadvantaged and the domestic nationality of the producers 
favored by those regulations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Should governments respond to public fears with regulations designed 
to reduce the feared risks if a risk assessment fails to identify a significant 
risk at stake?  Studies have confirmed that there is a vast disparity between 
the public perceptions of risk and the expert assessment of risk.1  Cass 
Sunstein has suggested that this “persistent split between experts and 
ordinary people” regarding risks “raises some of the most interesting 
problems in all of social science.”2  He distinguishes between the 
“technocrat,” who “would want to ignore public irrationality and to 
respond to risks if, and to the extent that, they are real,” and the “populist,” 
 
 1.  See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 33–39 (1993). 
 2. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2002) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Laws of Fear] (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)). 
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who “would want to respond to public concerns simply because they are 
public concerns.”3  In formulating the appropriate response to a “quasi-
rational public panic, based on an intense emotional reaction to a low-
probability risk,” Sunstein suggests, “both positions are far too simple.”4  
This ambivalent suggestion raises the question of how we choose between 
the response of the technocrat and that of the populist in particular cases.  
When should risk regulation ignore public fears that seem irrational to the 
expert technocrat and when, if ever, should it respond to them? 
The ongoing dispute between the United States and the European 
Union (“EU”) over the use of growth hormones in cattle provides a 
prominent example of an international controversy raising this question.  
The European Community (“EC”) banned the use of growth hormones in 
livestock farming and banned beef imports produced from cattle that had 
received these hormones.  The effect was to ban virtually all beef from the 
United States, which produces most of its beef with the use of growth 
hormones.  The EC claimed that meat from cattle treated with growth 
hormones was dangerous to human health, but the United States challenged 
this claim in a complaint before the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), 
which adopted a ruling by its Appellate Body against the EC.5  The 
Appellate Body cited Article 5.1 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”),6 which requires 
WTO members to base their health and safety regulations on scientific risk 
assessments.7 
While the United States claimed that the EC “ban lacked any scientific 
basis,” the EC cited “consumer anxiety over the safety of beef treated with 
hormones.”8  The EC argued that the anxieties and preferences of its 
 
 3. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 
102 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Probability Neglect].  See also Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, 
at 1120–21. 
 4. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 101–02. 
 5. See Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS/48/AB/R, para. 253 (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998), 
1998 WL 25520 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body]. 
 6. See id. para. 108 (citing Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures art. 5.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1994) [hereinafter SPS 
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.doc). 
 7. See SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5.1 (“Members shall ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to 
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the 
relevant international organizations.”). 
 8. Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating 
Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 627 
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consumers were legitimate factors supporting its ban on growth hormones.9  
In contrast, the United States maintained that consumer anxieties in the 
absence of any actual risk to human health were insufficient to justify the 
EC ban.10  Similarly, Canada also challenged the EC ban,11 in part as a 
measure based on “factors not relevant to the protection of health,” such as 
“meeting consumer anxieties,”12 and the WTO panel charged with settling 
the dispute seemingly agreed that “consumer preferences” should be 
irrelevant in a risk assessment.13  Thus, the dispute over the EC ban turned 
in part on the legitimacy of health regulations based on “bald consumer 
anxiety”14 unsupported by “hard scientific evidence.”15 
The debate over regulatory reform in the United States features the 
same controversy.  Some observers propose reforms based on “the 
recognition that disagreements over risk are reasonable” and on the premise 
that “public perceptions are entitled to as much deference as expert 
assessments.”16  Others propose reforms that stress “scientific integrity, 
especially as measured by quantitative risk assessment techniques.”17  
Some of these proposals would use these techniques “as a screening device 
to rationalize priorities in risk regulation and, in particular, to ensure that 
 
(1997).  See also Michael Trebilcock & Julie Soloway, International Trade Policy and Domestic Food 
Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Under the 
SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 537, 557 (Daniel L.M. 
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (noting that the “EU viewed the ban as a legitimate 
response to public concerns about carcinogenic effects from the use of hormones as growth stimulants, 
even if there was little scientific support for these concerns”). 
 9. See Carter, supra note 8, at 645, 652. 
 10. See id. at 638–39.  See also Donna Roberts, Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 377, 391–92 
(1998) (noting that in various reports pertaining to the hormone ban, the EC cited “restoration of 
consumer confidence in European beef as a goal,” and the United States pointed to these documents as 
“evidence that EC officials chose to maintain the ban in response to perceived, rather than actual, 
risks”). 
 11. Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)—
Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997), 1997 WL 561677 (W.T.O.) [hereinafter 
Report of the Panel]. 
 12. Id. para. 8.242. 
 13. See id. para. 8.108.  Vern Walker notes, however, that the “justifying role of consumer 
perceptions or anxieties remains remarkably unclear in the Panel Report.”  Vern R. Walker, Keeping the 
WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, 
and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 307 n.260 (1998) 
(citing Report of the Panel, supra note 11, paras. 8.181, 8.192, 8.216, 8.232–.241). 
 14. Carter, supra note 8, at 656. 
 15. Id. at 654. 
 16. James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating Community 
Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 576 (1994). 
 17. David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 335. 
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governmental resources and authority are directed toward substantial risks 
as opposed to small or trivial ones.”18 
What is striking about the SPS Agreement, according to David Wirth, 
is that its requirements regarding risk assessments provide “an opportunity 
or a temptation to accomplish substantive goals similar to those in the 
domestic regulatory reform debate through international processes in the 
face of domestic obstacles to achieving those same aims at the national 
level.”19  David Driesen concludes that although “the WTO has not 
embraced laissez-faire government as an explicit goal, the WTO has taken 
a substantial step in that direction” by “creating burdens governments must 
meet in order to impose regulations.”20  This remarkable intrusion into the 
regulatory decisions of WTO members raises the question: “if . . . 
consumer anxieties could not be respected, or domestic politics could not 
be taken into account, what would remain of the sovereignty inherent in 
risk management decisions?”21  The SPS Agreement, if applied 
aggressively, poses some risk of making the WTO into “a global meta-
regulator.”22  Michael Trebilcock and Julie Soloway warn that if the WTO 
becomes “a global science court and potential de novo global health and 
safety regulator,” it “would severely strain both its expertise and its 
legitimacy.”23  In this vein, Wirth criticizes the WTO panels in the 
hormones disputes for engaging in “a highly intrusive review . . . that 
would be well nigh unthinkable at the domestic level” and thus having a 
“potential chilling effect on legitimate domestic regulation.”24  Thus, the 
EU asserted that its “economic sovereignty” was at stake in the hormones 
dispute.25 
Given this perceived challenge to its sovereignty, perhaps it is not 
surprising that the EU has so far refused to comply with the WTO ruling in 
 
 18. Id. at 337. 
 19. Id. at 334. 
 20. David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and 
Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 300 (2001). 
 21. Walker, supra note 13, at 306–07. 
 22. Id. at 255.  See Driesen, supra note 20, at 296 (worrying that “the recent SPS Agreement 
invites WTO panels to second-guess [a] national government’s claims that the problem a regulation 
addresses warrants a regulatory remedy”). 
 23. Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 553.  See also id. at 541 (warning that the WTO 
could “invalidate . . . national legislation that . . . reflects a legitimate value choice on the part of 
domestic consumers”). 
 24. Wirth, supra note 17, at 343. 
 25. Timothy Aeppel, Europeans Not Cowed by US Threat, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10,  
1989, World Section, at 6 (reporting claims of EU officials that any country “should have the right to 
ban imports based on health concerns, even if those concerns seem excessive to outsiders”). 
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this dispute.  The United States has retaliated by imposing tariffs worth 
$116.8 million per year on imports from the EU.26  The EU may soon call 
upon the WTO to rule on this dispute again to remove the trade sanctions 
imposed by the United States.27 
Furthermore, new disputes are likely to require the WTO to apply the 
risk assessment requirements of the SPS Agreement to other regulations in 
the near future.28  The EU, for example, has imposed a de facto moratorium 
on foods derived from or containing genetically modified organisms 
(“GMOs”), blocking approval of even those GMOs judged safe by EU 
scientists.29  This moratorium has blocked exports from the United States to 
the EU, including corn exports worth $300 million per year.30  Concerned 
that other countries may emulate the EU policy on GMOs,31 U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick has indicated that the United States “has no 
other choice than to begin bringing the issue to a head in the WTO.”32  The 
United States has complained that the moratorium “is based on political 
considerations and not on sound science.”33  In particular, President George 
W. Bush has blamed “‘unfounded, unscientific fears’” for the 
moratorium.34  Thus, U.S. trade officials have threatened to challenge the 
moratorium as lacking the basis in “scientific evidence” required by the 
 
 26. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Calls for New WTO Proceedings to Determine Beef-Hormone 
Compliance, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 48, at 1988 (Dec. 4, 2003). 
 27. See id. 
 28. For example, proposed EU legislation would ban certain chemicals from cosmetics sold in 
the EU.  See Pat Phibbs & Bengt Ljung, Significant Effect on Cosmetics Makers Possible if EU Bans 
Chemicals as Proposed, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 48, at 2084 (Dec. 5, 2002).  This proposal has 
prompted an industry scientist to complain that “[i]t is not valid scientifically to ban something whether 
or not it has any risk.”  Id. (quoting Gerald McEwen, Vice President for Science at the Cosmetic, 
Toiletry, and Fragrance Association). 
 29. See Joe Kirwin, New EU GMO Regulation Takes Effect, but De Facto Moratorium Seen 
Persisting, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 42, at 1831 (Oct. 24, 2002). 
 30. See Neil King Jr., Zoellick Slams EU for ‘Immoral’ View on Biotech Crops, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 10, 2003, at A8. 
 31. See Edward Alden, US Ready to Declare GM Food War, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, World 
News Section, at 10; Christopher S. Rugaber & Gary G. Yerkey, Zoellick Favors Bringing WTO Case 
Against EU over GMO Biotech Moratorium, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 3, at 100 (Jan. 16, 2003).  
Third-world countries may restrict the use of GMOs in order to protect their access to markets in the 
EU.  See Christopher S. Rugaber, Grassley, Six Additional Senators Urge Bush Administration to Begin 
WTO Case on GMOs, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 1, at 21–22 (Jan. 2, 2003). 
 32. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Looking to Ask EU for Talks in WTO over Ban on Imports of GMO 
Food Products, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 42, at 1829 (Oct. 24, 2002). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Gary G. Yerkey, President Bush’s High-Profile Criticism of EU over GMOs Seen 
Exacerbating Trade Dispute, 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 22, at 916 (May 29, 2003). 
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SPS Agreement.35  Accordingly, the United States, joined by Canada and 
Argentina, has begun legal proceedings against the EU over its 
moratorium.36 
This Article examines the hormones dispute as a vehicle for 
addressing not only Sunstein’s debate between the technocrat and the 
populist but also the question of why the WTO should scrutinize the 
domestic risk regulations produced as the outcome of this debate within the 
political systems of sovereign WTO members.37  First, the hormones 
dispute sheds new light on this old debate by underscoring concerns that 
interest groups may promote and exploit public fears for private gain.  An 
appreciation of the role of interest groups suggests a new framework for 
evaluating policy responses to public fears unsupported by expert risk 
assessments.  Second, the hormones dispute places this policy debate in the 
context of international trade and thereby allows me to use this framework 
to shed new light on the rules applied and developed by the WTO in its 
effort to resolve the dispute. 
In Part II of this Article, I examine the countervailing considerations 
weighed by Sunstein in light of the example of the hormones dispute.  Even 
fears based on erroneous assumptions impose a real welfare loss on those 
who experience those fears.  Given these considerations, I question whether 
we may choose to ignore or to discount fears on the ground that they are 
“irrational” because they fail to reflect risk assessments, especially in the 
presence of uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the risks.  In Part III of 
this Article, I suggest an alternative framework that takes the social costs of 
these fears seriously but also considers the fact that these fears may be 
generated endogenously.  This approach suggests policy considerations that 
not only militate against responding to these fears with regulations but also 
militate in favor of particularly close scrutiny of regulatory responses that 
burden international trade.  This analysis offers a rationale for the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement and for the Appellate Body’s approach to 
the hormones dispute.  In Part IV of this Article, I offer some concluding 
remarks. 
 
 35. Gary G. Yerkey & Bengt Ljung, U.S. Sees ‘Some Hope’ of Settling Dispute with EU over 
GMOs Without Going to WTO, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 46, at 2039 (Nov. 28, 2002). 
 36. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Appoints Panelists to Rule on EU GMO Restrictions, 21 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 428 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
 37. Steve Charnovitz criticizes the intervention of the WTO in cases like the hormones dispute.  
See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), No. 41, at 1785 (Oct. 15, 1997) (“One would think the WTO would have enough irrational 
trade policies to attend to without having to meddle in irrational health policies.”). 
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II.  THE RATIONAL RESPONSE TO “IRRATIONAL” FEARS? 
Sunstein asks whether it may be appropriate, at least in some 
circumstances, to respond to public fears through risk regulation even when 
those fears are not justified by a risk assessment.38  After all, consumers 
may respond to their fears by avoiding activities, such as flying on 
airplanes or eating certain foods.39  These distortions in consumption 
patterns would entail a real loss in social welfare.  European consumers 
fearful of growth hormones, for example, might avoid eating beef, thereby 
forgoing the utility they would otherwise derive from beef consumption.  A 
ban on beef produced by using these hormones may entail costs for these 
consumers—for example, in the form of higher prices flowing from higher 
production costs40—but these costs may be smaller than the costs that 
would result from consumer anxieties regarding the safety of beef and the 
distortions in consumption patterns flowing from those anxieties. 
Indeed, when the European Parliament defended the EU ban on 
hormones, the debate stressed how beef sales in the EU had “suffered from 
consumer reaction to the issues of growth promoters.”41  According to the 
Appellate Body, the EU imposed its ban in the face of “intense concern of 
consumers . . . over the quality and drug-free character of the meat 
available in its internal market,” seeking “an increase in the consumption of 
beef” that would benefit all “non-hormone using farmers.”42  Thus, the EU 
maintained its ban in part to protect “public confidence about beef.”43  
According to EU officials, lifting the ban “would cause uncertainty among 
European consumers, who would likely lower their beef consumption.”44 
Even if that justification for a regulatory response seems legitimate, it 
would justify regulation only insofar as fear produces such distortions in 
behavior.  What if there are no such distortions?  In that case, we have 
nothing to fear but fear itself.  Similarly, suppose instead there are such 
distortions, but we must decide whether to regulate only insofar as justified 
 
 38. See Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 101–05. 
 39. Id. at 103. 
 40. See Janice Castro, Why the Beef over Hormones?, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, at 44 (reporting that 
hormone treatments save ranchers “approximately $20 per head”). 
 41. EU Looks to Conference to Justify Continued Ban on Growth Hormones, 12 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA), No. 38, at 1627 (Sept. 27, 1995) (noting a report that “beef consumption in Germany alone has 
dropped by 15 per cent in the space of a year”). 
 42. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 245. 
 43. RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1677 (2d ed. 2001). 
 44. EU Official Signals Continuation of Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 
Dec. 8, 1995, at 8 (quoting EU Agricultural Commissioner Franz Fischler as stating that “[a]ll surveys 
show that European consumers don’t want to buy hormone-treated meat”). 
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by the benefit of avoiding these distortions.  What if the distortions alone 
are too small to justify the regulation, but if we count the reduction in fear 
itself as a social benefit, then the total benefit would justify the regulation 
in question? 
Sunstein suggests that the “reduction of even baseless fear is a social 
good.”45  After all, fear itself is a real social cost, generating a genuine 
willingness to pay to eliminate or reduce the risk that is feared.46  Similarly, 
Robert Howse observes that “if citizens believe they need a certain 
regulation, however ‘deluded’ such a belief is, their utility will be reduced 
if they do not get it, in the sense that they will believe themselves exposed 
to a risk they believe to be significant.”47  He suggests that it may “make 
sense to ‘attend’” to citizens’ preferences, even if they “are not rational,” 
because “the utility from a regulation comes not only from the reduced 
likelihood of an event that one disvalues, but also from the psychological 
security that results from one’s belief about the protection one is 
receiving.”48  If so, then why not always respond to these fears with risk 
regulations, regardless of the findings of scientific risk assessments? 
A.  MISTAKES OF FACT 
Sunstein emphasizes that ordinary people commonly “err on the 
factual question: how large is the risk as a statistical matter?”49  There may 
be a good case for ignoring public fears that are based on false information 
regarding the risk.50  Perhaps we should not credit preferences that are 
based on mistakes of fact, such that if those holding those preferences knew 
the truth, they would prefer that we not respond to their misinformed 
preferences, or if they were to discover the truth after we respond, they 
 
 45. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 104 (noting that “fear is a real social cost”). 
 46. See Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 681, 687 (2002) (noting that “the experience of fear is a hedonic loss, and people are 
willing to pay money in order to reduce their feelings of fear and anxiety”).  This fear “raises the 
question of whether the government should devote resources to eliminating or reducing fear on the 
ground that it constitutes a welfare loss.”  Id. at 685. 
 47. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World 
Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2337 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 2350. 
 49. Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1150.  See id. at 1152 (arguing that “in the domains 
in which they specialize, experts are far more likely to be right than are ordinary people”); id. at 1155 
(suggesting “that many of the disagreements between experts and ordinary people stem from the fact 
that experts have more information”). 
 50. See Howse, supra note 47, at 2330 (“There is more to democracy than visceral response to 
popular prejudice and alarm; democracy’s promise is more likely to be fulfilled when citizens, or at 
least their representatives and agents, have comprehensive and accurate information about risks . . . .”). 
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would regret that we had used scarce social resources on reducing this 
risk.51  After all, the technocrat would point out that we could have saved 
more lives if we had used these resources on more significant risks.  
Perhaps “people are simply not focusing on the magnitude of the risk,” and 
“if this factor were brought to their attention, their judgments would shift 
accordingly.”52 
Even if the government takes the social costs of these fears seriously, 
it may seek to inform and educate the public as a way to eliminate the fear.  
If we can reduce fear at a lower cost through education than through risk 
regulation, then an education campaign is our most efficient policy.  In 
such cases, information should be our first choice as a response to fears 
based on erroneous assumptions.  Thus, if a government agency determines 
that “public alarm . . . is based on a misperception of the risk, then the 
government agency should perform an educational function.”53 
Sunstein warns, however, that “government is unlikely to be 
successful if it simply emphasizes the low probability that the risk will 
occur.”54  He notes, for example, that efforts to assure people of the low 
probability of harm from the abandoned hazardous waste in Love Canal 
“seemed to aggravate fear.”55  Similarly, “public demand for action” 
against the pesticide Alar did not seem “much affected by the EPA’s 
 
 51. John Harsanyi, for example, distinguishes between a person’s “manifest preferences,” which 
are “actual preferences as manifested by his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based 
on erroneous factual beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment 
greatly hinder rational choice,” and “true preferences,” which are “the preferences he would have if he 
had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possible care, and were in a 
state of mind most conducive to rational choice.”  John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of 
Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 55 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 
1982).  He argues that “social utility must be defined in terms of people’s true preferences rather than in 
terms of their manifest preferences.”  Id.  See also Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social 
Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 193, 206 n.153 (2000) 
(discussing Harsanyi’s distinction between true and manifest preferences). 
 52. Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1155. 
 53. W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risk, in RISKS, 
COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 135, 139 (Robert W. Hahn 
ed., 1996). 
 54. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 95. 
 55. Id. at 98–99.  See also Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Psychological Expected Utility Theory 
and Anticipatory Feelings, 116 Q.J. ECON. 55, 59 (2001) (noting that “not all individuals want or 
benefit from information” and that “information actually serves to raise anxiety in some cases”); 
Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1141 (“When people discuss a low-probability risk, their 
concern rises even if the discussion consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the 
likelihood of harm is infinitesimal.”). 
CHAN11FI.DOC 6/12/04  3:43 PM 
2004] RISK REGULATION, ENDOGENOUS PUBLIC CONCERNS 753 
cautionary notes about the low probability of getting cancer” from it.56  
Stephen Breyer is similarly skeptical about the effectiveness of “better ‘risk 
communications,’ such as efforts to explain risks to the public at open 
meetings,” which he suggests “may not suffice to alleviate risk regulation 
problems.”57  Thus, there may be little reason to believe that efforts to 
explain risks would be as effective in reducing fear as a regulatory response 
would be. 
Thus, it may often be the case that we must resort to risk regulation as 
the only policy that will succeed in alleviating public anxieties.  Sunstein 
suggests that “[i]f government cannot dissipate fear through information, it 
might be well advised to regulate, at least if regulation will eliminate fear 
in a relatively inexpensive manner.”58  This suggestion raises several 
questions: How expensive is too expensive to make the regulation 
worthwhile?  How do we decide whether we must turn to risk regulation as 
our second-best response?  In weighing the costs and benefits of a 
regulatory response, do we fully credit the willingness of people to pay to 
reduce fears that are based on mistakes of fact, or do we discount these 
fears because they are “irrational” in the eyes of experts? 
B.  UNCERTAINTY 
One reason that risk communications may fail to alleviate public fears 
derives from the uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the risk that 
invariably remains in the wake of any risk assessment.  The problems 
inherent in risk assessment in the face of scientific uncertainty make it 
difficult to characterize public fears as “irrational” or as based on mistakes 
of fact.  Suppose the risks are uncertain rather than known with certainty to 
be small.59  Should we then ignore public fears that seem “irrational” to the 
technocrat? 
 
 56. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 99.  See also Posner, supra note 46, at 686 
(noting that “fear and misinformation are not the same thing” and that “[f]earful people with the correct 
information still act as though the probability of the dreaded risk is higher than it is”). 
 57. BREYER, supra note 1, at 38. 
 58. Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1168. 
 59. See Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 565 (“For many actual or potential health and 
safety risks, scientific disagreement or uncertainty will be such that it is simply impossible to assign a 
point estimate to the probability . . . of the risk materializing . . . .”).  Here I allude to Frank Knight’s 
distinction between quantifiable “risk” and “uncertainty,” which we cannot measure.  FRANK H. 
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 233 (photo. reprint 1985) (1921).  More precisely, I mean 
to distinguish cases in which the data provide the technocrat with an objective basis for a “frequentist” 
measure of probability, see Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Harm: The Normative Foundations of 
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1313 (2003), from cases in which we have only a “Bayesian” 
subjective probability or “degree of belief,” see id. at 1312. 
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Consider the risks at issue in the hormones dispute.  Although the EU 
could point to studies showing the carcinogenic potential of growth 
hormones60 and to the opinion expressed by one scientist,61 the Appellate 
Body ruled against the EU because the studies cited by it did not assess the 
risks posed by consuming meat “when [hormones were] used specifically 
for growth promotion purposes.”62  The only available assessments of these 
specific risks showed that the hormones studied were “‘safe’” when used 
properly.63  In refusing to lift the hormone ban, EU officials stressed the 
risk that beef producers would not apply hormones under the conditions 
prescribed for safe use.64  Nevertheless, the Appellate Body ruled against 
the EU despite the absence of any risk assessment regarding the safety of 
one of the hormones in dispute65 and despite the absence of any assessment 
of the “risks arising from failure to observe the requirements of good 
veterinary practice . . . in the administration of hormones to cattle for 
growth promotion.”66 
If there have been no assessments regarding these risks, then how do 
EU consumers know whether beef treated with these hormones is safe?  
How does one know the magnitude of the health risk under those 
circumstances?  As Jagdish Bhagwati observes, risk regulations do not 
“always reflect compelling scientific evidence,” and instead it is often the 
case that “confirming evidence trails the concern.”67 
Suppose consumers are aware of the available risk assessments, which 
show that hormones are safe when used properly, but consumers 
experience anxiety despite knowing of these risk assessments.68  Efforts to 
 
 60. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 199. 
 61. Id. para. 198 & n.181 (discussing one scientist’s estimate that one in a million women alive 
today would get breast cancer from eating meat treated with growth hormones, a “single divergent” 
scientific opinion that was insufficient to overturn “the contrary conclusions reached in the scientific 
studies . . . that related specifically to residues of the hormones in meat from cattle to which hormones 
had been administered for growth promotion”). 
 62. Id. para. 199. 
 63. Id. para. 196 (quoting Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones)—Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, para. 8.124 (Aug. 18, 
1997), 1997 WL 569984 (W.T.O.)). 
 64. EU Official Signals Continuation of Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat, supra note 44, at 8 
(reporting the concern of one EU official who stressed that “there is no way to ensure that those specific 
conditions will always be met”). 
 65. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 201. 
 66. Id. para. 202.  See also id. para. 208 (noting the absence of such a risk assessment). 
 67. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Hormones and Trade Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1989, at A17 (arguing 
that “[t]he Europeans are fully within their rights . . . to ban consumption of hormone-fed beef”). 
 68. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 403 (suggesting that “in view of intermittent media reports 
about ‘hormone scandals’ over the past twenty years, many European consumers may prefer to 
consume hormone-free beef no matter what scientific evaluations conclude”).  Consumers might 
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educate the public may eliminate fear insofar as it is based on 
misinformation but may also leave a residue of fear that is not.69  Under 
these circumstances, the public may demand regulations that respond to 
these residual fears.70  To the extent that the fears to which we respond with 
risk regulation are well informed, this regulation avoids one possible 
objection to responding to such fears.71 
What if EU consumers who experience these fears actually understand 
the available scientific evidence but are worried about the risks that have 
not been studied, such as the risk of the abuse of hormones?  In fact, it was 
“this kind of risk that played an important role in the public outcry that had 
led to the EC ban in the first place.”72  The EU defended its ban by 
stressing “the need for strict adherence with veterinary practices in order to 
ensure safe usage of growth hormones.”73  Indeed, the Appellate Body 
conceded that the EU adopted its ban on the use of hormones because of  
“anxieties” concerning not only “the results of the general scientific studies 
(showing the carcinogenicity of hormones)” but also “the dangers of abuse 
(highlighted by scandals relating to black-marketing and smuggling of 
prohibited veterinary drugs . . . ) of hormones and other substances used for 
growth promotion.”74 
The EU also stressed scientific uncertainty and “its longstanding 
policy of precaution,” citing examples of substances that were once deemed 
safe but later found to pose grave health risks.75  Under the “‘precautionary 
 
declare, as one EU official put it, “‘we simply don’t want to consume these products,’” insisting that 
“‘there should only be hormone-free meat on the market.’”  EU Looks to Conference to Justify 
Continued Ban on Growth Hormones, supra note 41, at 1627 (quoting EU Agriculture Commissioner 
Franz Fischler). 
 69. See Posner, supra note 46, at 693 (“If the facts do not offer grounds for reassurance, or the 
public understands the threat as well as officials do, official reassurance might not be possible.”). 
 70. See Howse, supra note 47, at 2337 (“[E]ven if a deliberative process occurs where the 
requisite elements of democratic rationality are present, citizens may not change their views; once it is 
known that a risk is negligible . . . citizens may still want a regulation to be enacted or maintained.”). 
 71. See id. at 2330.  Howse contends that 
democracy . . . requires respect for popular choices, even if different from those that would be 
made in an ideal deliberative environment by scientists and technocrats, if the choices have 
been made in awareness of the facts, and the manner that they will impact on those 
legitimately concerned has been explicitly considered. 
Id.  See also Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1156 (calling for “more empirical work to 
determine the extent to which ordinary risk perceptions are based on errors or instead on values” and for 
“incorporation of people’s values [in risk regulation] to the extent that they can survive a process of 
reflection”); id. at 1168 (suggesting that “government and law should respond to people’s values, not to 
their errors”). 
 72. Howse, supra note 47, at 2344. 
 73. Carter, supra note 8, at 642. 
 74. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 245. 
 75. Carter, supra note 8, at 641. 
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principle,’” the EU is inclined “to err on the side of environmental and 
health protection . . . whenever the context is characterized by uncertain 
scientific conditions.”76  Should the precautionary principle allow the EU to 
justify its hormone ban in the absence of risk assessments to support this 
regulatory response?77  Although the Appellate Body agreed that 
“responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives 
of prudence and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, 
damage to human health are concerned,”78 it held that the “precautionary 
principle” did not “override” the requirement of specific risk assessments 
found in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement.79  The hormones dispute raises 
the question: Why should we deem regulations under such conditions of 
uncertainty to be irrational? 
C.  IRRATIONALITY OR A RIVAL RATIONALITY? 
Perhaps we should regard these risks flowing from the use of 
hormones as small, given the available evidence.  There may be some 
possibility that existing risk assessments are in error, that the technocrats 
are wrong in the conclusions they draw from them, or that we have failed to 
study some important risk.  Suppose past experience suggests that these 
errors or lapses are unlikely to be significant.  Are we justified in ignoring 
public fears that seem excessive from this perspective? 
Sunstein notes that even if “people are greatly concerned about a risk 
that has a small or even minuscule probability of occurring,” it may be 
rational to respond to that concern.80  “If I am afraid to fly,” he observes, “I 
might decline to do so, on the ground that my fear will make the experience 
quite dreadful (not only while flying but also in anticipating it).”81  Like the 
traveler who knows the statistics regarding the safety of air travel, yet 
experiences fear while flying in spite of this knowledge and therefore 
 
 76. Id. at 643. 
 77. See Charnovitz, supra note 37, at 1783 (inferring from the WTO panel report in the 
hormones dispute that the EU “asserted that the precautionary principle could provide a justification 
within the WTO for regulation in the absence of a risk assessment”). 
 78. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 124. 
 79. Id. para. 125.  The SPS Agreement expresses a version of the precautionary principle by 
providing that “[i]n cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may 
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information,” 
but it also requires that “[i]n such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the . . . measure accordingly 
within a reasonable period of time.”  SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5.7. 
 80. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 103. 
 81. Id.  See also Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 2004 (2001) 
(suggesting that “people’s subjective discomfort with airline travel should be counted as a social cost”). 
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chooses not to fly, the public may demand a ban on the use of growth 
hormones to reduce fear itself, knowing that the beef that is banned may 
pose little if any risk.  Resources may yield more lives saved when used to 
reduce other risks, but they may yield a greater reduction in fear if used to 
reduce this risk.  If fear is a social cost, like death or illness or injury, then 
fear reduction is also a social benefit worth pursuing. 
On the other hand, to the extent that technocrats are confident that 
they know “the facts” and that “people are far more concerned than the 
facts warrant,” we might deem these public fears “irrational.”82  Sunstein 
considers the failure “to think much about the question of probability” to be 
a form of “irrationality, not a rival rationality.”83  He seems ambivalent 
regarding the appropriate response to this “probability neglect,” which 
causes people to “overreact from the normative standpoint.”84  In order to 
prevent regulation based on such irrational probability neglect, he suggests 
a requirement of cost-benefit balancing as an institutional safeguard that 
may usefully focus risk regulation on the most significant risks and 
“provide a check on regulations that cannot be grounded in objective 
fact.”85 
In what sense, however, is a reaction reflecting probability neglect an 
overreaction?  Experiments indicate that under some circumstances people 
experience anxiety in the presence of any risk, large or small, some anxiety 
that is fixed in amount, rather than directly proportional to the risk, or some 
anxiety that is a function of variables other than probability of harm.  
Psychologists, for example, have studied physiological measures of stress, 
such as heart rate in people subjected to various risks of electric shock, and 
found no correlation between the probability of shock and these indicators 
of anxiety.86  Another study found that the amount that people were willing 
to pay to avoid an electric shock rose by only a moderate amount when the 
probability of that shock rose dramatically from one percent to ninety-nine 
percent.87  These results suggest a model in which “anxiety is an 
 
 82. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 103. 
 83. Id. at 84. 
 84. Id.  See also Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1123 (arguing that “ordinary people 
often deal poorly with the topic of risk” because “people often neglect probabilities”). 
 85. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 96. 
 86. See C. Peter Bankart & Rogers Elliott, Heart Rate and Skin Conductance in Anticipation of 
Shocks with Varying Probability of Occurrence, 11 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 160, 172 (1974); Alan Monat, 
James R. Averill & Richard S. Lazarus, Anticipatory Stress and Coping Reactions Under Various 
Conditions of Uncertainty, 24 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 252 (1972). 
 87. See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the 
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) (finding a willingness to pay a median 
price of $7 to avoid a 1% chance of shock and a median price of $10 to avoid a 99% chance of a shock).  
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anticipatory emotion experienced prior to the resolution of uncertainty,” 
imposing some “psychic costs” that are independent of the probability of 
harm as long as this probability is positive.88  In such a model, people may 
“appear to overreact to small probability events,” because even an increase 
in risk “from zero to some small positive number . . . may have a large 
effect” on anxiety.89  This response, however, is an overreaction only if we 
overlook the fact that people wish to avoid anxiety, which imposes “an 
extra cost” on them while they anticipate a possible harm.90 
In what sense is this anxiety irrational at all, especially given some 
inevitable uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the risks in dispute?91  
Why is the preference for avoiding beef treated with hormones not entitled 
to the same respect as any other preference, like a consumer’s preference 
for beef over pork?  Neither preference serves a useful function; they are 
simply desires.  Economists normally take people’s preferences as revealed 
by their choices and take the satisfaction of these preferences to be the 
objective.92  In what sense are fears that are not justified by risk 
assessments any less entitled to respect?  Who says that fears must be based 
on risk assessments in order to be rational?  Why do we think these fears 
should be distinguished from other tastes or preferences to which a 
regulator should respond?93 
 
Sunstein cites this experiment as a case in which a salient “worst case” is “driving judgment” and 
“undermining the mental operation of assessing probability.”  Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 
1139.  Yet there seems to be no confusion regarding the factual question of the statistical probability of 
electric shock, as the subjects in this experiment are informed of this probability.  See Rottenstreich & 
Hsee, supra, at 188. 
 88. Caplin & Leahy, supra note 55, at 69. 
 89. Id. at 70. 
 90. Id. at 56. 
 91. See Howse, supra note 47, at 2342 (arguing that “science cannot tell us just how conservative 
or protective it is reasonable to be in the presence of a given level of error or uncertainty in a scientific 
assessment of risk” and that “[w]hether it is rational for a government to take precautions in the 
presence of a given degree or kind of uncertainty in the scientific evidence will ultimately depend upon 
democratic judgments about the ‘appropriate level’ of protection”). 
 92. See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 19, 33 (noting the usual assumption in economics that “decisions about 
what people value should be left up to them”). 
 93. See Howse, supra note 47, at 2335 (suggesting a “version of deliberative democracy” that 
“would respect citizens’ real choices, even where these seem irrational as measured against what 
citizens might be expected to decide in a perfectly rational deliberative process, while . . . seeking to 
make the process as perfectly deliberative as possible”). 
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III.  ENDOGENOUS FEARS 
Perhaps we are troubled by the fact that these fears are generated 
artificially by publicity rather than derived from some objective source.  
Sunstein warns that “a highly publicized incident might exacerbate 
unwarranted or irrational fears.”94  He stresses that “news sources can do a 
great deal to trigger fear,” simply by reporting salient examples of bad 
outcomes.95  Yet these fears are no less real and no less rational than other 
tastes and preferences shaped by the media through advertising, for 
example. 
Nevertheless, an approach that attends to the dynamics that generate 
and sustain public fears may be more useful than one that dismisses some 
of these fears as “irrational.”  The fact that fears are not simply exogenous 
but created endogenously may have some important normative implications 
for risk regulation.  Even if we consider the reduction of these fears to be a 
social benefit, whether or not a technocrat would consider them rational, 
the endogenous nature of these fears may suggest sound reasons to avoid 
risk regulations based on these fears. 
A.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
First, perhaps fears fed by the media yet deemed by technocrats to be 
baseless are likely to prove fleeting or transient.96  Such fear may be likely 
to subside with time and more experience with the feared product.97  This 
 
 94. Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note 2, at 1131 (noting that “[t]he flow of information, 
especially via the media, can be extremely important not only in spreading facts but also in shaping 
perceptions”).  See also Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 546 (noting that distortions in public 
perceptions of risk “are often exacerbated by sensationalist media reporting of actual or potential 
risks”). 
 95. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 85.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous 
Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 242 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Endogenous Preferences] (noting that the “public demand for regulation” seems to be “itself 
endogenous to the nature and levels of public and private publicity”); Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra 
note 2, at 1127 (noting that “highly publicized events make people fearful of statistically small risks”). 
 96. See Carter, supra note 8, at 652 n.192 (warning of the “fluctuating moods” of “very fickle 
consumers” concerned about beef).  One British butcher described the “volatile public mood” in the 
wake of the panic regarding bovine spongiform encephalopathy (“BSE”), or “mad cow disease”: “‘Two 
weeks ago, all you ever heard was . . . how American beef was bad because it is loaded with growth 
hormones . . . . Then the papers are full of BSE . . . . Do you think anybody gives a damn about growth 
hormones now?’”  Bruce Wallace, Panic on the Hoof: Fears of ‘Mad Cow Disease’ Lead to a 
Worldwide Ban on British Beef, MACLEAN’S, Apr. 8, 1996, World Section, at 26, 28. 
 97. See Posner, supra note 46, at 688 (“Fear of a risk appears often to diminish with time and 
continued exposure to the risk.”); id. at 693 (“When people spend a lot of time exposed to a risk, they 
put it out of their mind.”). 
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feature of these fears suggests that the lowest-cost response may be to 
“[c]hange the subject,” or to “discuss something else and to let time do the 
rest,” or perhaps to do nothing and simply wait for the fear to pass.98  To 
the extent that these fears are temporary, the social cost of failing to 
respond to them is correspondingly limited. 
Second, given that to create fear is to create a social cost and induce 
regulation in response, both the media and the government should refrain 
from encouraging fears where the risks are small and thus risk regulation 
would do the least good.  The government “has an obligation to foster 
responsible behavior with respect to exaggerated risks”; therefore, “in the 
presence of alarmist responses to risk, the government should not 
institutionalize those behavioral errors.”99  In particular, governments 
should “not rush to regulate inconsequential risks that the public incorrectly 
believes are important.”100  We should avoid these risk regulations in part 
because they lend credibility to groundless fears.101  It would be myopic for 
the government to respond to public fears and the welfare losses that they 
entail without taking into account the legitimacy that a regulatory response 
would confer upon those fears.  This effect would make it all the more 
difficult to dispel these fears and thus eliminate the welfare losses that 
induced the government to adopt costly regulations in the first place.  Risk 
regulations that sustain fears unjustified by risk assessments will needlessly 
foster demands that the regulations remain in place, especially if these 
regulations prevent consumers from gaining any experience with the 
supposedly risky product.102 
 
 98. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 95.  See also Posner, supra note 46, at 688 
(arguing that “regulation might be justified in the short term by fear, but not in the long term in light of 
people’s capacity to adjust”); id. at 693–94 (suggesting that “the best policy will sometimes be to do 
nothing, and wait for people to adjust” and that “we would prefer officials to resist political pressure 
and do nothing until the fear diminishes on its own”). 
 99. Viscusi, supra note 53, at 139. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that “public pressure . . . may encourage Congress to 
enact standards,” but “Congressional reaction provokes further public concern,” creating a vicious 
circle).  See also Posner, supra note 46, at 689 (suggesting that “governments aggravate the risks of 
panic by taking visible or unusual steps to combat the underlying risks of harm”).  Sunstein notes that 
“[w]hen preferences are a function of legal rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the 
preferences.”  Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 95, at 235.  In such cases, “it may 
therefore be important to make some choice about the sorts of preferences that ought to be encouraged, 
rather than to act as if preferences can be kept constant.”  Id. 
 102. The discriminatory taxation discussed in the Report of the Panel, Japan—Customs Duties, 
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1988), raised an analogous problem.  In that case, Japan imposed lower 
taxes on shochu, a traditional Japanese liquor, than it imposed on similar imported liquors, and the EU 
brought a complaint alleging discrimination among “like” products.  See id. paras. 2.1–3.1, at 85–88.  
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Had the government never imposed the regulations in the first place, 
consumer anxiety may have already dissipated and would no longer 
provide any demand for regulation.  In weighing the costs that risk 
regulations would impose over the long term against the costs imposed by 
the public fears that such regulations would address, both the transient 
nature of those fears and the tendency for regulations to reinforce public 
fears militate against a regulatory response.  These two considerations 
together suggest that the most efficient response to these fears, in some 
cases, may be to refrain from risk regulation despite the costs imposed by 
public fears. 
Third, there is the danger that fearmongers will manipulate public 
policy by generating or maintaining public fear.  Special interests might 
create fear in order to generate risk regulation that serves their own private 
interests, rather than the public interest in reducing the most important 
risks.  Those who experience some fear may seek to instill the same fear in 
others, because if more people share their fear, then they can bring about 
risk regulation that responds to this fear.  Business interests might promote 
fear in order to generate regulations that ban the products of competitors or 
otherwise put the competition at a disadvantage.  Any lobbying effort 
entails social costs insofar as special interests invest scarce resources in 
such risk-seeking behavior.  Investments in public fear, however, entail an 
additional cost imposed on the public in the form of fear, an external cost 
not internalized by those special interests. 
Insofar as fear imposes welfare losses, the creation of fear is socially 
costly.  Perhaps there is some value to legal rules (such as risk assessment 
requirements) or institutions that commit governments not to respond to 
fears that the technocrat would deem “irrational,” if this commitment 
discourages those who would generate these fears to obtain the risk 
regulation that they favor.  Even if governments thereby fail to respond to 
genuine public fear, we may derive an offsetting benefit by discouraging 
the promotion of those fears least supported by the scientific evidence.  
That is, even in cases in which it might be efficient ex post to regulate, 
because the social costs of these fears exceed the social costs of regulation, 
 
The panel addressing the complaint ruled in favor of the EC, explaining that “‘like’ products do not 
become ‘unlike’ merely because of differences in local consumer traditions . . . , which were often 
influenced by external government measures (e.g. customs duties).”  Id. para. 5.9(b).  Otherwise, 
“discriminatory or protective internal taxation of imported products would distort price competition . . . 
by creating different price and consumer categories and hardening consumer preferences for traditional 
home products.”  Id.  To permit a government to justify its discriminatory treatment of products based 
on consumer preferences that are themselves in part the result of that discriminatory treatment would 
allow policies that crystallize consumer preferences in favor of domestic producers. 
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the ex ante benefit of reducing incentives to promote these fears may tip the 
balance in favor of ignoring these fears instead. 
Deciding whether regulation would minimize social costs would entail 
a complex calculation of all these costs and benefits.  If a regulator could 
gather and process all the necessary information at no cost, then it would be 
ideal for the regulator to perform the appropriate calculation on a case-by-
case basis, tailoring its response to all the relevant circumstances in each 
specific context.  If we could measure the magnitudes of all the effects of 
regulation, not only ex post but also ex ante, without cost or error, then we 
could make each decision based on the net benefit of regulation in each 
case. 
Regulation would produce some benefit ex post by reducing the level 
of public fear and possibly by reducing some genuine risks to public health.  
Regulation, however, would also impose costs ex post on the entities 
regulated, costs that firms may pass on to consumers in the form of higher 
prices.  Furthermore, insofar as regulation would lend legitimacy to public 
fears, it would extend the lives of these fears and thereby increase the costs 
that they impose on the public ex post, not only directly but also indirectly 
through the distortions in behavior and costly regulations that these fears 
induce.  Finally, a decision to regulate based on those ex post effects would 
also create an incentive for those special interests that benefit from 
regulation to promote public fears ex ante so as to generate enough fear to 
trigger regulation.  Increased public fears would in turn increase social 
costs not only directly but also indirectly by increasing distortions in 
behavior and both the frequency and stringency of regulations ex post.  
Thus, although increased public fears would appear to increase the benefits 
of regulation ex post, we would ideally take into account the incentives 
created by the prospect of regulation itself and ignore the public fears 
created by special interests with this prospect in mind.  Insofar as these 
fears are generated endogenously, then the benefits of regulation would be 
smaller than they appear ex post, once we understand that a commitment 
not to regulate in these cases would imply less fear generated ex ante in 
such cases. 
Conversely, a decision not to regulate would avoid all of these ex post 
and ex ante costs but also forgo the ex post benefits of regulation.  The 
decision whether to regulate in each case would depend on the size of all of 
these various effects.  We should regulate if the benefits of regulation ex 
post in terms of reductions in both risk and fear would outweigh the costs 
of regulation.  Some of these regulatory costs would be present ex post 
even if public fears were purely exogenous.  Regulations also impose costs, 
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however, because a refusal to regulate would ultimately reduce public fears 
in the future.  This reduction would occur ex post because public fears 
would be less durable in the absence of regulation, bringing an earlier end 
to the social costs imposed ex post by those fears.  Further reductions in 
fear would also occur because special interests would generate less fear ex 
ante in similar cases in the future. 
In the real world, however, not all relevant information will be 
available at low cost.  The task for the government becomes even more 
complex once we recognize that this information may be costly or 
impossible to gather.  In reality, we can perform our welfare analysis only 
imperfectly and must bear some risk of error in calculating the net benefits 
of regulation in any given case.  Given the uncertainty regarding the 
magnitudes of the various effects of regulation, we may use simpler rules 
of thumb to guide the regulator.  We may rely on imperfect proxies for the 
variables that we would ideally observe perfectly.  These proxies would be 
signals of the values of those variables but would be less costly to observe 
than those ideal variables.  Use of simple proxies may also make it easier to 
predict the outcome of the analysis, which, on the other hand, would be 
only imperfectly correlated with the outcome that would flow from the 
ideal cost-benefit analysis.  Given these considerations, which 
circumstances should raise a presumption against regulation? 
The decision to regulate would depend, for example, on whether the 
prospect of risk regulation is significant as an incentive for the promotion 
of public fears.  The greater the incentive created ex ante by this prospect, 
the more reluctant the regulator should be to regulate on the basis of net 
benefits ex post.  Insofar as special interests can disguise endogenously 
generated fears as exogenous, however, they can confuse regulators into 
regulating in response to endogenous fears; thus, special interests would 
still have an incentive to generate public fears ex ante.  Under these 
circumstances, a regulator should consider the incremental effect that its 
decision would have on this incentive by reducing the probability that 
endogenous fears will trigger regulation.  A regulator should also recognize 
that a commitment not to regulate is more likely to be worthwhile ex ante 
when the expected cost of this commitment is small, that is, when 
regulation is least likely to be efficient ex post. 
In light of these considerations, the requirement of a risk assessment 
can provide a reasonable proxy for circumstances justifying regulation.  If a 
risk assessment provides evidence of a threat to public health, then it 
suggests that the ex post benefits of regulation are significant, both because 
regulation protects public health and because public fears are based on 
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exogenous scientific evidence.  This evidence suggests that these fears will 
persist rather than erode with time and experience, which also militates in 
favor of regulation.  Thus, regulations supported by risk assessments are 
likely to be efficient ex post, even in the absence of endogenously 
generated fears.  Insofar as special interests promote public fears in the 
hopes of inducing risk regulation, a requirement of scientific evidence 
directs their efforts toward those regulations that would be most likely to be 
efficient anyway based on exogenous factors. 
Although scientific evidence may imply a strong case in favor of 
regulation, it does not follow that the absence of such evidence would 
imply a strong case against regulation.  A decision against regulation might 
require further indications.  If a risk assessment indicates the absence of a 
threat to public health, for example, then the case against regulation is 
stronger than a case in which there simply has been no risk assessment.  
These observations bring us to the next question: Under what 
circumstances should the absence of scientific evidence raise a presumption 
against regulation? 
B.  PUBLIC CHOICE AND PROTECTIONISM 
While a regulator seeking to maximize national welfare would 
compare the costs and benefits of risk regulation, the SPS Agreement gives 
the WTO the role of reviewing national regulations allegedly unjustified by 
health or safety concerns.  That is, the SPS Agreement reflects an 
assumption that we cannot always trust national regulators to adopt 
regulations that produce benefits sufficient to justify the costs that the 
regulations impose.  In particular, the danger of inefficient risk regulations 
may be especially acute when domestic producers or other special interests 
promote fear of imported products and lobby for regulations that respond to 
those fears. 
We can generally count on firms that are burdened by risk regulation 
to exert political pressure opposed to that regulation.  Normally, this 
pressure may be effective in preventing the most costly or the least justified 
regulations.  Indeed, standard “public choice” considerations may lead us 
to expect industry lobbyists generally to be too successful in blocking 
regulations that protect the interests of a large and diffuse group, like those 
who benefit from environmental protection.103  The costs of these 
regulations may be concentrated on particular industries, so that individual 
 
 103. See Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global 
Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2205–06 (1995). 
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firms in these sectors may have much to gain by blocking the regulations.  
Even if the benefits of regulation exceed the costs, these benefits may be 
spread among so many individuals that few find their interests at stake 
sufficient to justify much lobbying effort.  As a result, we often expect 
government officials to be more responsive to producer interests than 
environmental interests.  We may not normally expect environmentalists to 
lobby successfully for regulation unless the benefits of regulation are 
considerable.  Therefore, as a general matter, we may not consider a lack of 
supporting scientific evidence to be sufficient by itself to render regulations 
particularly suspect. 
When the competitors that are disadvantaged by risk regulation are 
foreign, however, their political influence with the government of the 
importing country may be limited.  Therefore, there may be good reasons 
to be especially concerned with the use of risk regulations that burden 
international trade.  Defects in the political process may make inefficient 
risk regulation especially likely when the producers who would usually be 
the most vocal opponents of regulation are foreign.104 
Jonathan Wiener and John Graham note that “[o]ne prominent source 
of narrow decision-making is what one might call ‘omitted voice’: the 
absence of affected parties from the decision process and the concomitant 
disproportionate influence of organized interests.”105  Therefore, Howse 
suggests, “the wider the range of voices that have a say in the regulatory 
process, the more likely certain kinds of errors and misunderstandings 
concerning risk will be avoided.”106  The danger of these errors is acute 
when risk regulations place foreign producers at a disadvantage.107  Thus, 
 
 104. Thus, “local producer interests wielding excessive power in the political process” allow local 
producers “to exploit disorganized consumer interests” through protectionist legislation.  Donald H. 
Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal 
System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1861 (2001).  We might hope 
that foreign producers can act as proxies for those consumer interests that are jeopardized by 
protectionist regulations, but it is precisely the fact that those proxies are “foreign and unrepresented 
that invites exploitation of consumers by local producers.”  Id. at 1878 n.37. 
 105. Jonathan Baert Wiener & John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: 
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226, 230 (John D. Graham & Jonathan 
Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (noting that a “decisionmaker is unlikely to take account of countervailing 
losses imposed on constituencies who are not participating in the dialogue”). 
 106. Howse, supra note 47, at 2356. 
 107. Howse points to Article 5.4 of the SPS Agreement, which states that WTO members 
“‘should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, take into 
account the object of minimizing negative trade effects.’”  Id. (quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 6, 
art. 5.4).  He interprets this obligation to mean that “regulators must attend to the voices of those 
affected by the negative trade impacts of regulation, not simply shut them out of the process of 
determining the level of protection.”  Id. 
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“especially with respect to trade regulations, ‘democratic’ outcomes 
typically reflect capture of the regulatory process by concentrated 
interests,” so that “hand-tying of the political process by international rules, 
or by an apolitical authority such as ‘science,’ actually may enhance 
domestic welfare.”108  Thus, commentators often describe the risk 
assessment requirement of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement as a device to 
prevent domestic industries from generating risk regulation that serves as a 
disguised form of protectionism.109 
In fact, the United States argued in the hormones dispute that the EU 
ban reflected “a desire to protect the . . . domestic cattle industry” rather 
than “legitimate health concerns.”110  The United States claimed that the 
EU ban was “a disguised restriction on international trade” in violation of 
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.111  The complainants in the hormones 
dispute also claimed that inconsistencies in the EC’s regulation of 
hormones in different contexts violated Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, 
which prohibits “arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions” in the levels of 
protection against risk “in different situations, if such distinctions result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”112 
 
 108. Id. at 2333.  See also Ryan David Thomas, Note, Where’s the Beef? Mad Cows and the 
Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 491 (1999) (arguing that “a country 
should be limited in the range of discretion it has” in health regulations “to protect the interests of those 
foreign . . . peoples to whom the state owes no political accountability”). 
 109. See, e.g., Wirth, supra note 17, at 333–34 (describing “the tests of scientific validity found in 
recent international trade agreements” as “intended . . . to limit the abuse of putatively scientific claims 
for protectionist purposes”); Carter, supra note 8, at 656 (describing the requirement of “scientific 
analysis” as designed “to ensure that restrictions on trade are not disguised as health regulations”); 
Thomas, supra note 108, at 489 (describing the risk assessment requirement as designed “to ensure that 
bona fide health regulations are passed, not ‘protectionist’ devices under the pretext of ‘public health’”).  
The Clinton administration described the SPS Agreement in similar terms before Congress.  See 
Implementation of the Uruguay Round as It Affects United States Agriculture: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 103d Cong. 22 (1994) (statement of Mike Espy, U.S. 
Secretary of Agric.) (predicting that the SPS Agreement “will discourage countries from using 
unjustified health-related measures as disguised barriers to trade”); id. at 69 (statement of Michael 
Kantor, U.S. Trade Rep.) (stating that the SPS Agreement “provides safeguards against blatant trade 
protectionism in the guise of a health regulation”). 
 110. Carter, supra note 8, at 637.  See also Aeppel, supra note 25, at 6 (reporting U.S. claims that 
“the Europeans are trying to put up an unfair trade barrier” and that “standards—even those attributed to 
health concerns—could be used to block imported goods”); Senators Urge Interim Curbs on Beef 
Imports from EC in Response to EC Ban on Hormone Use, 5 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 43, at 1447 
(Nov. 2, 1988) (quoting a letter written by U.S. senators urging retaliation against the EU and charging 
that the hormone ban was “‘an obvious trade barrier hiding behind the veil of “food safety”’”). 
 111. Carter, supra note 8, at 639.  See also SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.3 (“Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade.”). 
 112. SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5.5 (“With the objective of achieving consistency in . . . 
the concept of appropriate level of . . . protection against risks . . . , each Member shall avoid arbitrary 
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C.  BEYOND THE SHAM PRINCIPLE 
While ruling that the EU ban on hormones violated the risk 
assessment requirement in Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate 
Body also explicitly rejected claims that the EU ban represented “‘a 
disguised restriction on international trade,’” reversing the panel below, 
which had found the EU to be in violation of Article 5.5.113  The Appellate 
Body cited the “documentation that preceded or accompanied the 
enactment of the prohibition of the use of hormones for growth 
promotion,” which “makes clear the depth and extent of the anxieties” and 
“the intense concern of consumers” regarding “the quality and drug-free 
character of the meat available in [their] internal market.”114  The Appellate 
Body rejected the inference drawn by the panel that the hormone ban was 
“not really designed to protect [the EC’s] population from the risk of 
cancer, but rather to keep out US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and 
thereby to protect the domestic beef producers” in the EC.115 
Thus, the Appellate Body did not rule against the EU on the basis of 
the “sham principle,” under which regulations “may be directly reviewed 
for improper motive.”116  There was no finding in the hormones dispute 
that “the purported high-minded objectives” of the EU ban were 
“disingenuous” or that the “real motive” was protectionist.117  Instead, the 
ruling in the hormones case reflected a requirement of “credible scientific 
evidence” under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, which is “related to the 
sham principle” but is also a distinct principle designed to guard against 
protectionism.118  The hormones dispute demonstrates both how the 
scientific evidence principle is broader than the sham principle and how a 
broader principle may be necessary to guard against more subtle forms of 
protectionism. 
First, the WTO may be reluctant to accuse one of its members of 
offering a sham justification.  Such a charge risks a backlash from the 
 
or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such 
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”). 
 113. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 246 (quoting SPS Agreement, supra 
note 6, art. 5.5). 
 114. Id. para. 245. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (1999). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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government accused of insincerity.119  Thus, even in cases in which a WTO 
member does invoke a policy rationale disingenuously, it may create 
political difficulties for a WTO panel or for the Appellate Body to invoke 
the sham principle.120 
Second, as the EU noted in the hormones dispute, “legislation (in 
representative governments) normally reflects multiple objectives,” so that 
the ban on hormones could address both economic concerns and safety 
concerns.121  All regulations serve multiple purposes, and therefore 
protectionist intent may be a subtle matter of degree.  Not only a 
protectionist purpose but also other policy objectives may play some role in 
the adoption of any given regulation.  Thus, identifying a protectionist 
regulation based on the motives of legislators or regulators may be difficult 
or infeasible.122  Donald Regan has suggested that a regulation “should 
count as having been adopted with a protectionist purpose when the 
contribution of the protectionist forces was a but-for cause of the 
decision.”123  Making this determination, however, is not always easy, and 
the answer may be unclear.124 
In the case of the EU ban on hormones, for example, some observers 
claim that environmentalists “had been quietly supported in the campaign 
against beef hormones by some European beef producers who . . . wanted 
to stop U.S. producers from increasing their share of the European 
market.”125  Other observers maintain that the EU “imposed the ban in 
response to internal social demands from health groups[,] not from any 
desire to protect domestic producers.”126  The hormones dispute illustrates 
 
 119. See Charnovitz, supra note 37, at 1785 (describing the defiant European response to the 
WTO panel report accusing the EU of “disguised protectionism”). 
 120. See Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 542 (noting that an inquiry “into the actual 
motives of domestic legislators or regulators” entails “highly intrusive and diplomatically offensive 
supranational scrutiny of domestic governments’ bona fides in adopting or maintaining challenged 
regulations”). 
 121. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 244 (noting the EC’s claim that “the 
predominant motivation” for its hormone ban is “the protection of the health and safety of its 
population”). 
 122. See Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 542 (noting that an inquiry into the “motives of 
domestic legislators or regulators is a highly speculative exercise (given political log-rolling, posturing, 
and dissembling, and the potential for regulatory capture)” and that “motivations . . . may be mixed”). 
 123. Regan, supra note 104, at 1884. 
 124. Id. at 1890. 
 125. Michael B. Smith, GATT, Trade, and the Environment, 23 ENVTL. L. 533, 537 (1993) 
(asserting that “the beef hormone affair had a protectionist undercurrent”).  Thus, the EU adopted its 
ban on hormones “inter alia for protectionist reasons.”  Id. at 538.  See also Castro, supra note 40, at 44 
(reporting claims by U.S. trade officials that the EU ban “is motivated in large part by protectionism”). 
 126. Bhagwati, supra note 67, at A17 (claiming that “the suspicion . . . that the Europeans are 
really out to restrict our exports” simply “reflects petulance and paranoia”).  See also Castro, supra note 
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the difficulties in evaluating the regulator’s motives in the face of these 
contending characterizations of the same political process, especially if the 
WTO is reluctant to accuse regulating member governments of 
misrepresenting their motives. 
Third, although the Appellate Body noted that no one suggested that 
“the import prohibition of treated meat was the result of lobbying by EC 
domestic producers of beef,”127 protectionist intent need not take the 
obvious form of lobbying at the time of enactment.  Instead, a regulation 
may begin as a response to public anxieties and then subsequently evolve 
into “an expedient non-tariff barrier” to imports.128  A regulation that no 
longer serves a legitimate purpose “may be hard to get rid of if it suits some 
special interest.”129 
In the hormones dispute, for example, the EU adopted its hormone ban 
in response to “a huge consumer crusade” against the use of hormones, a 
campaign “led by a loose coalition of consumer advocates and 
environmentalists.”130  Thus, the Appellate Body emphasized the role of 
consumer anxieties in bringing about the hormone ban, focusing on the 
politics of its enactment rather than on subsequent developments.  The EU 
would later maintain this ban, however, in part because its beef farmers 
feared that beef imports from the United States “could steal market share 
from EU beef.”131  In refusing to lift the hormone ban, EU officials cited 
concerns that “lifting the ban would create an over-supply of meat, which 
could drive rural beef suppliers out of business.”132 
Regan suggests that we ask whether “if the legislature considered the 
issue anew, it could not adopt or continue the challenged product standard 
except on protectionist grounds.”133  If the Appellate Body found that the 
legislature could not, it could “treat the regulation as protectionist and 
 
40, at 44 (reporting the claims of EU officials that the regulation was “designed to protect the public 
health”). 
 127. Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 5, para. 244. 
 128. See Roberts, supra note 10, at 386 (noting the U.S. view that the EU ban represented a 
decision that “subsequently evolved into an expedient non-tariff barrier”). 
 129. Regan, supra note 104, at 1869. 
 130. Aeppel, supra note 25, at 6.  See also Howse, supra note 47, at 2330 (noting that the EU 
hormone ban “directly responded to widespread fears of citizens about the risks presented by such 
hormones”); Castro, supra note 40, at 44 (reporting how the EU adopted the hormone ban after 
“Europeans became fearful of hormone supplements”). 
 131. BHALA, supra note 43, at 1677. 
 132. EU Official Signals Continuation of Ban on Hormone-Treated Meat, supra note 44, at 8 
(reporting the claims of one EU official that “the EU is generally not short of meat, and does not need 
U.S. imports”). 
 133. Regan, supra note 104, at 1870. 
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strike it down without reference to the actual history of its adoption or 
continuation.”134  The answer to this hypothetical question, however, may 
be even more obscure than the motives underlying the actual adoption of a 
regulation.  We could adopt an approach to this difficult question that gives 
the benefit of the doubt to the regulator.  Regan, for example, proposes that 
we overturn a regulation “[o]nly if there could be no plausible explanation 
other than purposeful protectionism” for the regulation,135 but this 
deferential review may allow more protectionism than WTO members 
would like to permit. 
Fourth and most important, regulatory barriers to trade need not be 
characterized by any manifest insincerity on the part of legislators or 
regulators.  Instead, these barriers may simply reflect the general tendency 
for foreign producers to exert less influence over public policy than 
domestic producers.  Thus, we might seek to prevent not only sham 
regulations but also any other unjustifiable regulation adopted because the 
firms disadvantaged by the regulation happen to be disproportionately 
foreign rather than domestic.  We might seek to discourage these 
regulations even if only environmental or safety concerns motivated the 
proponents of regulation.  That is, we might define protectionism more 
broadly to include any inefficient regulation that the importing country 
would not have adopted but for the foreign nationality of the firms placed 
at a competitive disadvantage and the domestic nationality of the firms 
favored by the regulation. 
Not only domestic producers but also environmentalists may have 
incentives to create public fears in order to obtain regulations responding to 
those fears.  To the extent that the environmentalists’ fears are unsupported 
by evidence, public fears are less likely to persist over the long term, and a 
regulatory response is less likely to be efficient.  Nevertheless, regulators 
and legislators may be especially prone to adopt such inefficient risk 
regulations when the producers burdened by the regulation are 
disproportionately foreign.  In such cases, domestic producers stand to gain 
from the hobbling of their foreign competition, so their opposition to 
regulation will be muted.  Foreign producers may object, but they may 
have little influence in the domestic political process in the importing 
country.  Once we recognize the tendency for national governments to 
adopt inefficient regulations that have the effect of protecting domestic 
industry from foreign competition, we may respond to this problem through 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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WTO rules that target regulations with protectionist effects, even in the 
absence of protectionist intent.136 
Thus, the scientific evidence principle can serve as a valuable 
prophylactic rule, not only when, as is often the case, the sham principle is 
too cumbersome an instrument to be useful against conscious 
protectionism, but also to guard against protectionism understood in a 
broader sense.137  The requirement of a risk assessment provides a 
relatively workable rule for cases like the hormones dispute.  It may be 
easier for the WTO to use this rule than to apply the sham principle or to 
conduct a complex analysis of the welfare effects of the regulation in 
question.  The scientific evidence principle avoids not only the inquiry into 
motive required by the sham principle but also any direct evaluation of 
economic efficiency per se or of the fairness of the political process 
producing the regulation.  Rather than requiring such sensitive and difficult 
inquiries, the scientific evidence principle uses the absence of scientific 
evidence as a signal of protectionism, understood to refer to a particular 
type of defect in the political process that generates inefficient regulations 
that burden trade.  The absence of a risk assessment that justifies the 
regulation in question is a proxy for this protectionism because it implies a 
greater likelihood that the regulation is inefficient.  Thus, we use this risk 
assessment requirement as a crude but relatively simple filter to screen out 
regulations that raise a presumption of inefficiency.  Insofar as this 
 
 136. In a similar vein, Trebilcock and Soloway suggest that the WTO look for “a disparate impact 
on imports relative to competitive domestic products” in order to screen out “welfare-reducing 
regulatory protectionism while leaving unconstrained consumer welfare-enhancing risk regulation.”  
Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 8, at 550. 
 137. Regan suggests that we ask whether “the transfer of business from foreign producers . . . to 
their local competitors” is “significant enough” to have “plausibly . . . mobilized local producers behind 
a protectionist agenda,” whether this transfer “did in fact mobilize such a protectionist agenda[,] and 
whether that was what carried the legislature.”  Regan, supra note 104, at 1892.  I define protectionism 
somewhat more broadly, however, to include some cases of what Regan calls “unconscious 
protectionism.”  Id. at 1896.  Regan notes that unconscious protectionism may include efficient 
regulations that a legislature would not have adopted but for the foreign nationality of the producers 
opposing the regulations.  Id.  “It makes no sense,” Regan observes, “to say that foreigners are entitled 
to . . . the distortions that they would be able to accomplish” if they were domestic rather than foreign.  
Id. at 1897.  “They do have a right to not be excluded from the market by inefficient regulation, but that 
obviously gives them no right to the invalidation of an efficient regulation . . . .”  Id.  Thus, my 
definition of protectionism requires the regulation in question to be inefficient.  Regan dismisses 
concerns regarding unconscious protectionism on “the standard assumption that the well-motivated 
legislature does right by local interests.”  Id.  Given that in reviewing domestic laws for protectionism 
we are generally concerned with failures of legislatures to do right by local interests (including 
consumers), it seems inappropriate to make this assumption here.  See supra note 104 and 
accompanying text. 
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requirement in the SPS Agreement deters regulations that fail to meet it,138 
it contributes to social welfare, not only because these regulations are less 
likely to be efficient ex post, but also because this requirement will tend to 
discourage domestic producers and any other special interests from 
promoting costly consumer anxieties regarding imports ex ante, whether 
through the media or through successful lobbying for risk regulation.  This 
prophylactic approach guards against protectionism (broadly understood) 
without the difficulties entailed by a direct search for protectionist motive 
or for economic inefficiency on a case-by-case basis.139 
D.  WHAT ROLE FOR CONSUMER ANXIETIES? 
While the Appellate Body in the hormones dispute held that consumer 
anxieties unsupported by any risk assessment cannot justify a risk 
regulation under the SPS Agreement, the ruling in the hormones case also 
indicates that consumer anxieties may play some role in justifying risk 
regulations that burden international trade.  Although the Appellate Body 
found the hormone ban unsupported by any risk assessment and therefore a 
violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, its reasoning regarding 
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement “was based on consumer anxiety about 
the risk of cancer, not on the risk of cancer itself.”140  Thus, if the EU were 
to produce a risk assessment showing that the use of growth hormones 
poses a risk to human health, it could successfully defend otherwise 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions” in its regulatory response “in 
 
 138. One might infer from the hormones dispute itself that the WTO is ineffective in preventing 
risk regulations unsupported by risk assessments.  After all, the EU still refuses to lift the ban 
challenged in this dispute.  See Joe Kirwin, EU Farm Ministers Agree to Legalize Ban on Hormone-
Treated Beef Products, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 50, at 2169 (Dec. 19, 2002).  Zoellick, the U.S. 
Trade Representative, however, argues that the WTO ruling in the hormones dispute has prevented 
other countries from adopting regulations like those adopted by the EU.  Alden, supra note 31, at 10; 
King, supra note 30, at A8; Rugaber & Yerkey, supra note 31, at 100. 
 139. Regan argues that “any judicial invalidation of a regulation, on any ground, entails some 
criticism of the regulator.”  Regan, supra note 104, at 1891.  A regulator, however, may especially 
resent some claims, such as the accusation of dishonesty required by the sham principle, or accusations 
that the regulator is “irrational, or ill-informed, or . . . motivated by protectionist purpose.”  Id.  Other 
claims, such as the charge that the regulator is “insensitive to . . . foreign interests,” may seem more 
benign.  Id.  After all, we do not normally require governments to give foreigners and constituents equal 
weight.  Instead, as a general matter, “we do not require even-handed representation; the foreign 
interests have no right at all to representation.”  Id. at 1897.  Furthermore, if we invoke a prophylactic 
rule that is understood to be overbroad, invalidating some regulations that may not be protectionist at 
all, then we make no accusation regarding the regulator’s motives in any particular case.  This feature 
may make it easier for WTO panels and the Appellate Body to apply such a rule than to apply the sham 
principle. 
 140. Walker, supra note 13, at 308 n.264. 
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different situations” by citing differences in consumer anxieties.141  Thus, 
once a WTO member meets the threshold requirement of a risk assessment, 
there is no further obligation to base regulatory responses on cost-benefit 
analysis or to make those responses proportionate to the risks posed.  
Instead, these responses may vary with the degree of anxiety among 
consumers of the products in question. 
This role for consumer anxieties in justifying regulations raises many 
of the same problems posed by regulatory responses to fears unsupported 
by risk assessments.  Insofar as the magnitude of these fears may reflect 
probability neglect, these regulations may fortify disproportionate fears that 
would otherwise erode over time.  By choosing to regulate some risks 
rather than others, “a government may reinforce popular prejudices about 
which risks are serious.”142  Furthermore, the prospect of these regulations 
may encourage domestic producers or other special interests to promote 
these fears, especially if these regulations would put foreign competitors at 
a disadvantage. 
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body’s compromise regarding the role of 
consumer anxieties may be a reasonable approach from the standpoint of 
economic efficiency if fears based on risks identified by a risk assessment, 
even excessive fears, are likely to be more durable.  Furthermore, given the 
phenomenon of probability neglect,143 excess fear may arise exogenously, 
without any endogenous promotion by special interests seeking a 
regulatory response.  Insofar as these fears are more resistant to efforts to 
educate the public than fears unsupported by any risk assessment, it is more 
likely to be efficient to take these fears into account in risk regulation and 
less likely to be efficient to ignore them.144 
Thus, the economic framework set forth in this Article may provide a 
consequentialist rationale for the Appellate Body’s holdings.  This 
rationale, however, depends on the magnitudes of the various effects of risk 
regulation in the relevant circumstances.  That is, the proposed justification 
ultimately turns on the answers to a series of empirical questions.  In this 
 
 141. SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5.5. 
 142. Howse, supra note 47, at 2352–53. 
 143. See Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 3, at 63. 
 144. Furthermore, Trebilcock and Soloway note that “a consistency requirement rigorously or 
expansively applied would render a vast array of risk regulations potentially suspect.”  Trebilcock & 
Soloway, supra note 8, at 552.  Thus, the Appellate Body may be reluctant to adopt a more aggressive 
interpretation of the consistency requirement of the SPS Agreement because such an interpretation 
would imply a broader intrusion into the domestic laws of WTO members.  The WTO may shy away 
from that more intrusive scrutiny of national laws because such an ambitious undertaking would raise 
questions regarding the legitimacy of the WTO’s role in reviewing the regulations of sovereign states. 
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sense, the framework proposed here also suggests the type of empirical 
evidence that could provide a basis for a critique of the Appellate Body’s 
approach rather than a justification. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It may not be easy to dismiss public fears as “irrational,” even if they 
are excessive from the perspective of the technocrat.  Although we may 
consider fears based on mistakes of fact to be clear cases of fears that we 
should ignore, there are both theoretical and practical problems in refusing 
to respond to such fears with risk regulations.  We might seek to identify 
and eliminate mistakes of fact by educating the public, but communicating 
information more effectively has proven difficult in practice.  Furthermore, 
the public reaction to the information provided by a risk assessment may 
differ from the technocrat’s reaction, given some uncertainty over the 
magnitudes of the risk studied or of other risks not subjected to scientific 
study at all.  Finally, whether the public perceives the magnitudes of risks 
correctly or not, the fear of these risks imposes real social costs that risk 
regulations can reduce, which suggests that it should always be appropriate 
to consider reductions in these fears a social benefit militating in favor of 
regulation.  The hormones dispute between the United States and the EU 
provides an illustration of these problems in the international context. 
This Article explores an alternative approach to these problems that 
does not require us to characterize any fears as irrational and thus not 
worthy of the regulator’s respect or concern.  Instead, we might take the 
reduction of public fear as a legitimate objective of risk regulation, whether 
this fear seems rational or irrational to the technocrat, but also take into 
account the implications of regulation for the promotion of this fear.  Once 
we view this fear as an endogenous variable, we must consider how a 
regulatory response would foster fear not only directly, by reinforcing 
popular prejudice, but also indirectly, by providing a further incentive for 
special interests to promote both the fear and the corresponding regulatory 
response. 
This framework allows us to distinguish various risk regulations from 
the perspective of economic efficiency, based in part on how intense or 
persistent public fears would be in the absence of a regulatory response.  
Public fears unsupported by risk assessments may be less likely to persist 
in the absence of a regulatory response than fears based on such scientific 
evidence.  Furthermore, fears without such a basis are less likely exogenous 
and more likely generated endogenously by special interests seeking a 
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regulatory response.  If so, then a risk assessment requirement may be an 
efficient constraint to impose on risk regulations, at least for regulations 
that place foreign producers at a disadvantage and are thus especially likely 
to prove inefficient. 
By applying this framework to the hormones dispute, we can develop 
a justification not only for the risk assessment requirement in the SPS 
Agreement but also for the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement to allow some scope for domestic regulations to respond to 
consumer anxieties that may seem excessive from the perspective of the 
technocrat, as long as those anxieties derive some support from risk 
assessments.  We might understand the SPS Agreement as a commitment 
not to respond to consumer anxieties when such a response is least likely to 
be efficient and thus most likely to reflect a protectionist bias against the 
foreign producers burdened by the regulatory response.  This bias need not 
be conscious.  Instead, legislators or regulators may tend to adopt 
inefficient regulations with protectionist effects even in the absence of any 
protectionist motive.  The SPS Agreement serves to curb protectionism 
understood in this broader sense. 
I have presented this approach as an alternative framework that allows 
us to distinguish between fears that reflect risk assessments and those that 
do not, and thus to respond to fears validated by those assessments while 
ignoring those that are not, without dismissing the fears we ignore as 
irrational.  I do not, however, intend to imply that these approaches are 
mutually exclusive alternatives.  To the extent that we believe that fears 
that fail to reflect risk assessments are based on mistakes of fact or are 
otherwise unworthy of the regulator’s concern, such a belief reinforces the 
case against a regulatory response to those fears.  My analysis suggests, 
however, that we may not need to rely on such beliefs, which may be 
controversial, to justify risk assessment requirements or other rules that 
militate against regulations that respond to those fears. 
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